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One of These Interns Is Not like the 
Others: How the Eleventh Circuit 
Misapplied the “Tweaked Primary 
Beneficiary” Test to Required Clinical 
Internships 
SAMUEL C. GOODMAN* 
   Today’s ever-changing business environment continues to 
challenge the traditional educational model, further blur-
ring the line between learning and labor. This has resulted 
in great uncertainty as to the proper legal treatment of the 
student intern, specifically the unpaid student intern. 
   This Note is intended to introduce a new perspective to the 
unpaid internship debate and highlight the need for courts 
to focus on the specific type of internship at issue before for-
mulating an approach to best assess whether the intern 
should be classified as an employee entitled to wages. Part I 
of the Article will discuss the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) and the development of the “trainee” exception 
formulated by Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. The key 
question in any unpaid internship scenario is whether the in-
tern should be deemed an employee under the FLSA and  
thus entitled to wages and overtime. 
   Part II explores the varying and inconsistent tests put forth 
by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and/or used by courts 
to determine whether a person should be deemed an em-
ployee under the FLSA and therefore entitled to wages. Part 
III then addresses the most recent test formulated by the Sec-
ond Circuit and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit and sug-
gests that neither court considered key differences between 
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internship scenarios in deciding upon the proper test. Part 
IV expands on this suggestion by identifying several reasons 
why the test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is not appropri-
ate to address the narrow, but prevalent clinical internship 
scenario in which the internship is both a required compo-
nent of the academic program and mandated for profes-
sional certification and licensure. Part V ultimately con-
cludes that the clinical intern is a student engaged in re-
quired experiential learning as a component of an overall 
academic curriculum and professional certification. Be-
cause a student is not a worker, the courts should find that 
the clinical intern does not qualify as an employee under the 
FLSA and is not entitled to wages. 
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Examine the following two internship scenarios: 
 
Internship A: John Doe leaves his stable desk job at an insur-
ance company to pursue his dream of becoming a film editor.1 In his 
fervor to excel in his newly chosen career path, John enrolls in a 
non-degree graduate film program at a local university.2 He also ap-
plies for, and is accepted to work on, the set of a movie production 
as an intern.3 Among other assignments, John is tasked with copying 
and filing documents, drafting cover letters, tracking purchase or-
ders, and running errands.4 At one point, John walks more than a 
mile to purchase a hypo-allergenic pillow for the filmmaker.5 John 
does not receive any school credit for his work on the movie set and 
he is not paid for any of his work during the internship.6 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Daniel Miller, Hollywood intern case dealt setback by federal appeals 
court, LOS ANGELES TIMES (July 2, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://www.latimes.com/en-
tertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-unpaid-hollywood-intern-legal-case-dealt-
blow-by-u-s-appeals-court-20150702-story.html. 
 2 See Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 532 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 Id. at 532; Miller, supra note 1. 
 6 See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 532–33. 
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Internship B: Jane Doe enrolls in a degree program at a Florida 
university to become a registered nurse.7 The nursing program lasts 
4 semesters and, in addition to classroom learning, it includes clini-
cal experience at community health clinics, agencies, hospitals, and 
homes.8 The clinical work Jane engages in is required for her nurs-
ing degree to be conferred, and it is also mandated by the Florida 
Board of Nursing and by Florida law, which requires that at least 
40% of the nursing curriculum be clinical training.9 At all times dur-
ing her clinical work, Jane is supervised by a faculty member or 
clinical preceptor.10 Jane receives school credit for her clinical 
work11 and fulfills requirements under Florida law and the Florida 
Board of Nursing.12 She is not paid. 
In recent years, the unpaid internship has become a prevalent 
issue, fiercely debated amongst interns, employers, universities, and 
policy-makers alike.13 This is due in no small part to the pervasive-
ness of internships—both paid and unpaid—in the modern job mar-
ket14. Although exhaustive data on internships does not exist, recent 
                                                                                                             
 7 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA NURSING ADMISSIONS, http://admis-
sions.nursing.ufl.edu/degrees/undergraduate/generic-bsn/program-description/ 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2015). 
 8 Id. 
 9 See Practical and Registered Nurse Education Program, FLORIDA BOARD 
OF NURSING, http://floridasnursing.gov/licensing/practical-and-registered-nurse-
education-program/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2015); FLA. STAT. § 464.019 (2015). 
 10 See FLA. STAT. § 464.019. 
 11 See UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA NURSING ADMISSIONS, supra note 7. 
 12 Section 464.019 of the Florida Statutes; Practical and Registered Nurse 
Education Program, supra note 9. 
 13 See, e.g., Nona Willis Aronowitz, ‘No one should have to work for free’: 
Is this the end of the unpaid internship?, NBC NEWS, (Sept. 2, 2013), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/no-one-should-have-work-free-
end-unpaid-internship-v20262899; Hu Wei, Unpaid Internships: Good for Intern 
or Company?, VOICE OF AMERICA (July 22, 2015, 5:58 PM), 
http://www.voanews.com/content/unpaid-internships-who-bene-
fits/2874306.html; Vance Ginn & Carine Martinez-Gouhier, Paid or Unpaid In-
ternship? Let Individuals Decide, FORBES, (June 26, 2014, 8:29 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/06/26/paid-or-unpaid-internship-let-
individuals-decide/. 
 14 See Andrew Soergel, Paid Interns More Likely to Get Hired, U.S. NEWS, 
(May 5, 2015, 5:30 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/arti-
cles/2015/05/05/study-suggests-college-graduates-benefit-more-from-paid-in-
ternships. 
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studies estimate that more than half of graduating college seniors 
hold some type of internship during their time in school.15 Accord-
ing to a 2015 report by the National Association of Colleges and 
Employers, 39.2% of these internships were unpaid.16 A clear dis-
tinction arises between paid and unpaid internships in relation to the 
receipt of job offers: 72.2% of the class of 2015 who had completed 
a paid internship at a for-profit company received a job offer, while 
only 33.8–50% of students with unpaid internships received a job 
offer (compared to an offer rate of 36.5% for students with no in-
ternship experience at all).17 Disillusioned former unpaid interns 
point to a model that takes advantage of students and recent gradu-
ates with no bargaining power,18 while employers and universities 
point to the invaluable experiential learning and opportunities for 
employment that an internship provides as justification to keep the 
system intact.19 
Notably absent from the unpaid internship debate, however, is 
any distinction between the types of internships at issue. Should 
courts use the same criteria for John—an unpaid intern on a movie 
set who receives no school credit, and Jane—a nursing student en-
gaged in clinical training required for her degree and licensure, 
when evaluating their entitlement to wages? 
The Second Circuit entertained facts analogous to John’s situa-
tion in July 2015.20 The court formulated a new test to be used to 
determine whether an intern should be classified as an employee en-
titled to wages.21 
                                                                                                             
 15 Blair Hickman, 6 Facts You Should Know If You’ve Ever Worked As An 
Unpaid Intern, ALTERNET (July 30, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/economy/6-
facts-you-should-know-if-youve-ever-worked-unpaid-intern. 
 16 The Class of 2015 Executive Summary, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
COLLEGES AND EMPLOYERS, http://www.naceweb.org/uploadedFiles/Con-
tent/static-assets/downloads/executive-summary/2015-student-survey-executive-
summary.pdf, (last visited April 18, 2017). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Matthew Tripp, Note, In The Defense Of Unpaid Internships: Proposing A 
Workable Test For Eliminating Illegal Internships, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 341, 343 
(2015). 
 19 Robert J. Tepper & Matthew P. Holt, Unpaid Internships: Free Labor or 
Valuable Learning Experience, 2015 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 323, 326–27 (2015). 
 20 See generally Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 21 Id. at 536. For a detailed discussion of the test see infra Part III.A. 
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In September 2015, the Eleventh Circuit faced facts similar to 
Jane’s situation relating to graduate-level nurse anesthetists who 
completed mandatory clinical work as a component of their master’s 
degree and professional certification and licensure.22 The court read-
ily adopted the test formulated by the Second Circuit, but specifi-
cally for clinical interns working toward a degree and professional 
certification and licensure.23 Should the court have entertained the 
critical differences between the types of internships at issue before 
adopting the Second Circuit’s approach? 
This Note is intended to introduce a new perspective to the un-
paid internship debate and highlight the need for courts to focus on 
the specific type of internship at issue before formulating an ap-
proach to best assess whether the intern should be classified as an 
employee entitled to wages. Part I of the Article will discuss the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)24 and the development of the 
“trainee” exception formulated by Walling v. Portland Terminal 
Co.25 The key question in any unpaid internship scenario is whether 
the intern should be deemed an employee under the FLSA and thus 
entitled to wages and overtime.26 
Part II explores the varying and inconsistent tests27 put forth by 
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and/or used by courts to deter-
mine whether a person should be deemed an employee under the 
                                                                                                             
 22 See generally Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
 23 Id. at 1211–12. For a detailed discussion of the test see infra Part III.B. 
 24 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012). 
 25 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
 26 See, e.g., Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1207–08; McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 
1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989) (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting) (“the true legal issue is 
whether the trainees were “employees” within the definition of 29 U.S.C.A 
§§ 203(e)(1).”). 
 27 For further discussion on the different legal standards used by the DOL and 
the courts to determine employment status under the FLSA see, e.g., Madiha M. 
Malik, Note, The Legal Void of Unpaid Internships: Navigating the Legality of 
Unpaid Internships in the Face of Conflicting Tests Interpreting the FLSA, 47 
CONN. L. REV. 1183, 1189–1203 (2015); Stephanie A. Pisko, Comment, Great 
Expectations, Grim Reality: Unpaid Interns And The Dubious Benefits Of The Dol 
Pro Bono Exception, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 613, 619–24 (2015); Paul Budd, 
Comment, All Work And No Pay: Establishing The Standard For When Legal, 
Unpaid Internships Become Illegal, Unpaid Labor, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 451, 457–
76 (2015). 
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FLSA and therefore entitled to wages. Part III then addresses the 
most recent test formulated by the Second Circuit and adopted by 
the Eleventh Circuit and suggests that neither court considered key 
differences between internship scenarios in deciding upon the 
proper test. Part IV expands on this suggestion by identifying sev-
eral reasons why the test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit is not ap-
propriate to address the narrow, but prevalent clinical internship sce-
nario in which the internship is both a required component of the 
academic program and mandated for professional certification and 
licensure. Part V ultimately concludes that the clinical intern is a 
student engaged in required experiential learning as a component of 
an overall academic curriculum and professional certification. Be-
cause a student is not a worker, the courts should find that the clini-
cal intern does not qualify as an employee under the FLSA and is 
not entitled to wages. 
I.   EARLY LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
A.   The Fair Labor Standards Act 
In 1938, Congress enacted the FLSA28 with the intention “to aid 
the unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation’s work-
ing population; that is, those employees who lacked sufficient bar-
gaining power to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence 
wage.”29 Due to this unequal bargaining power between employers 
and certain segments of the working population, compulsory federal 
legislation was required to prevent private employment contracts 
that would endanger national health and efficiency.30 The FLSA re-
quires public and private employers to pay their employees a federal 
minimum wage.31 
The minimum wage requirement is subject to a small number of 
statutory exceptions.32 For example, the FLSA creates exemptions 
                                                                                                             
 28 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19. 
 29 Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945). 
 30 Id. at 706–07. 
 31 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 
 32 29 U.S.C. §§ 213–14. 
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for tipped employees (such as waiters),33 agricultural employees,34 
switchboard operators,35 and full-time students working in retail or 
service.36 As discussed in greater detail in Part I.B, the Supreme 
Court carved out an additional exception for “trainees” in Portland 
Terminal. 37 
The uncertainty over internships arises because the FLSA does 
not exempt or define interns.38 Similarly, the FLSA provides protec-
tions to all “employees,”39 but it gives only a circular and unhelpful 
definition of the term: “any individual employed by an employer.”40 
The Act goes on to explain that the term “employ” means “to suffer 
or permit to work.”41 The threshold issue for any unpaid internship 
inquiry thus becomes whether the intern qualifies as an “employee” 
under the FLSA (therefore entitled to a minimum wage).42 
B.  Portland Terminal’s “trainee” exception 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the legality of unpaid in-
ternships, and so the courts often turn to Portland Terminal43 as a 
                                                                                                             
 33 29 U.S.C. § 203(m). 
 34 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6). 
 35 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(10). 
 36 29 U.S.C. § 214(b)(1)(A). 
 37 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
 38 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19; see also Phil Antis, The Fate of the Unpaid Intern – 
The Saga Continues, FEDERAL LAWYER , July, 2014, at 21, 21 (noting that the 
FLSA does not define the term intern or provide a statutory exception to the FLSA 
for interns); Lauren Fredericksen, Comment, Falling Through the Cracks of Title 
VII: The Plight of the Unpaid Intern, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 245, 250 (2013) 
(“[t]he FLSA does not provide a definition of ‘intern,’ nor does it give courts 
guidance on whether or not employers may even legally hire unpaid student in-
terns.”). 
 39 29 U.S.C. § 206(a). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). 
 41 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). 
 42 See, e.g., Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1207–08 
(11th Cir. 2015); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(Wilkins, C.J., dissenting) (“the true legal issue is whether the trainees were “em-
ployees” within the definition of 29 U.S.C.A §§ 203(e)(1)”); Chad A. Pasternack, 
No Pay No Gain? The Plus Side of Unpaid Internships, 8 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 193, 195 (2014) (“[t]o assess whether an unpaid intern-
ship is within the bounds of the law, the threshold inquiry is whether the intern is 
an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).”) 
 43 330 U.S. 148 (1947). 
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starting point to determine a worker’s employment status under the 
FLSA.44 In Portland Terminal, the Administrator of the Wage and 
Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor brought a 
claim against a railroad company on behalf of prospective brakeman 
for unpaid wages.45 The prospective brakemen participated in the 
railroad company’s training program with the hopes of subsequent 
employment after the training period concluded.46 The training 
lasted seven to eight days, and the trainees would first learn “routine 
activities by observation” and then were “gradually permitted to do 
actual work under close scrutiny.”47 The trainees did not displace 
any regular employees nor expedite the railroad’s business, but at 
times they actually impeded it.48 If the trainee successfully com-
pleted the program and received a certificate of competence, then he 
was either immediately offered work or placed on a list of qualified 
candidates from which the railroad could draw for its employment 
needs.49 
The Court began its statutory interpretation by noting that “with-
out doubt, the . . . [FLSA] covers trainees, beginners, apprentices, or 
learners if they are employed to work for an employer for compen-
sation.”50 The Act’s definition of employ “was obviously not in-
tended to stamp all persons as employees who, without any express 
or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own ad-
vantage on the premises of another. Otherwise, all students would 
be employees of the school or college they attended, and as such 
entitled to receive minimum wages.”51 The Court then explained 
that the broad definitions of “employ” and “employee” could not 
“be interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only his 
own interest an employee of another person who gives him aid and 
instruction.”52 Thus, the railroad trainees were not “employees” un-
der the FLSA; the railroad company received no immediate ad-
vantage from any work done by the trainees, and the company 
                                                                                                             
 44 Pasternack, supra note 42, at 196–197. 
 45 330 U.S. at 148. 
 46 See id. at 149. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 149–50. 
 49 Id. at 150. 
 50 Id. at 151 (emphasis added). 
 51 Id. at 152. 
 52 Id. 
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should not be penalized “for providing, free of charge, the same kind 
of instruction [as a public or private vocational school] at a place 
and in a manner which would most greatly benefit the trainees.”53 
The holding effectively established the trainee exception to the 
FLSA’s minimum wage requirement. 
II.  POST-PORTLAND TERMINAL INTERPRETATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT 
STATUS UNDER THE FLSA 
A.   Interpretations by the Department of Labor 
The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor is re-
sponsible for enforcing the FLSA.54 The DOL, and its Wage and 
Hour Division, have relied heavily on the opinion in Portland Ter-
minal in formulating a test to determine whether certain classes of 
persons qualify as employees who are entitled to wages.55 In 1933, 
the Wage and Hour Division issued a Field Operations Handbook, 
in which it listed six criteria used to determine whether a trainee or 
student qualifies as an employee.56 The six criteria are the following: 
(1) the training, even though it includes actual operation of the fa-
cilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a 
vocational school; (2) the training is for the benefit of the trainees or 
students; (3) the trainees or students do not displace regular employ-
ees, but work under their close observation; (4) the employer that 
provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the ac-
tivities of the trainees or students and on occasion his operations 
may actually be impeded; (5) the trainees or students are not neces-
sarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training period; and 
(6) the employer and the trainees or students understand that the 
                                                                                                             
 53 Id. at 153. 
 54 29 U.S.C. § 204 (2012). 
 55 See David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 
CONN. L. REV. 215, 227–28 (2002); Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 
F.3d 1199, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015) (“it is equally plain from reviewing the six fac-
tors that the Handbook derived them by simply reducing the facts of Portland 
Terminal to a test.”). 
 56 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD OPERATIONS 
HANDBOOK, CH. 10: FLSA COVERAGE-EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, 
STATUTORY EXCLUSIONS, GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS, § 10b11 (1993), 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf. 
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trainees or students are not entitled to wages for the time spent in 
training.57 According to the Field Operations Handbook, all six cri-
teria must be met in order to find that “trainees or students are not 
employees within the meaning of the FLSA.”58 
The Department of Labor also released a Fact Sheet in April 
2010 in response to nationwide criticism in the wake of the recession 
and increased scrutiny by state governments of unpaid internships.59 
The Fact Sheet provides “general information to help determine 
whether interns must be paid the minimum wage and overtime under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act for the services that they provide to 
‘for-profit private sector employers.’”60 
The Fact Sheet begins with the presumption that private sector 
internships will “most often be viewed as employment,” but that cir-
cumstances exist in which individuals who participate in private sec-
tor internships or training programs may do so without requiring 
compensation; this occurs when a six-factor test is met.61 The Fact 
Sheet then effectively restates the six-factor trainee test promulgated 
by Portland Terminal and codified in the Field Operations Hand-
book and applies it to interns by substituting “intern” and related 
words for “trainee” and related words.62 The DOL has not justified 
it full-fledged virtual adoption of the Field Operation Handbook’s 
trainee guidelines nor has it explained why there should not be an 
individual test to assess unpaid interns under the FLSA.63 Like the 
trainee test in the Field Operation Handbook, the Fact Sheet’s test 
                                                                                                             
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Craig Durrant, Comment, To Benefit or Not To Benefit: Mutually In-
duced Consideration As a Test For The Legality Of Unpaid Internships, 162 U. 
PA. L. REV. 169, 175 (2013). 
 60 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #71: INTERNSHIP 
PROGRAMS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2010), 
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET 
#71]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. 
 63 See Jaclyn Gessner, Note, How Railroad Brakemen Derailed Unpaid In-
terns: The Need For a Revised Framework To Determine FLSA Coverage For 
Unpaid Interns, 48 IND. L. REV. 1053, 1060–63 (2015). 
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for internships requires all six prongs to be met in order for no em-
ployment relationship to exist under the FLSA (and for the mini-
mum wage and overtime provisions not to apply to the intern).64 
In addition to the test, the Fact Sheet provides supplemental 
guidance on several of the six factors.65 For example, the Fact Sheet 
provides that the more an internship is structured around the class-
room or academic experience, the more likely it will be considered 
an extension of the intern’s academic experience.66 Similarly, if the 
internship provides job shadowing opportunities under close super-
vision, but the intern performs minimal or no work, the activity is 
more likely to be seen as an educational experience.67 On the other 
hand, if the intern receives the same level of supervision as regular 
employees, this would suggest an employment relationship and the 
intern would be entitled to wages.68 
The Wage and Hour Division has also published a series of opin-
ion letters applying the six-factor test from the Field Operations 
Handbook to a number of internship scenarios to determine whether 
a student intern is covered by the FLSA.69 For example, the Division 
issued a March 13, 1995 opinion letter, responding to an inquiry as 
to whether or not certain college interns were employees under the 
FLSA.70 The interns received college credit for their work and did 
not displace regular employees but they were not paid.71 The Divi-
sion concluded that it could not make a definite determination on 
employee status, but it explained that if “this internship program is 
predominately for the benefit of the college students, . . . [the Wage 
and Hour Division] would not assert an employment relationship.”72 
The Division responded to a similar inquiry on May 8, 1996 about 
a different internship program for academic credit.73 The Division 
noted: 
                                                                                                             
 64 See FACT SHEET #71, supra note 60. 
 65 See id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Yamada, supra note 55, at 228–29. 
 70 Id. at 229. 
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. 
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In situations where students receive college credits 
applicable toward graduation when they volunteer to 
perform internships under a college program, and the 
program involves the students in real life situations 
and provides the students with educational experi-
ences unobtainable in a classroom setting, we do not 
believe that an employment relationship exists be-
tween the students and the facility providing the in-
struction.74 
Although the DOL’s guidelines are, at best, afforded some level 
of deference in the courtroom75 and its opinion letters are merely a 
source of persuasive authority, both reflect the Wage and Hour Di-
vision’s perspective on student interns.76 Taken together, these 
sources seem to suggest that the Division does not intend for interns 
participating in school-sponsored internship programs to be ac-
corded employee status under the FLSA.77 
B.  Interpretations by the courts 
In the aftermath of Portland Terminal and the supplementary 
guidance provided by the Wage and Hour Division, the courts have 
split on how to approach various working relationships, such as un-
paid internships, under the FLSA. Different jurisdictions have for-
mulated and applied different tests based upon the level of deference 
given to the Wage and Hour Division’s guidelines, the interpretation 
                                                                                                             
 74 Id. 
 75 Compare Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1209 
(11th Cir. 2015) (“[t]his test is not a regulation, and it did not arise as a result of 
rule-making or an adversarial process. At most, it is entitled to Skidmore defer-
ence, meaning that the deference it is due is proportional to its power to per-
suade.”) (internal quotations omitted) and Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 
811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d. Cir. 2015) (“an agency has no special competence or role 
in interpreting a judicial decision.”) with Atkins v. General Motors Corp., 701 
F.2d 1124, 1127–28 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Wage and Hour Division’s 
6-factor test for trainees is entitled to substantial deference). 
 76 See Yamada, supra note 55, at 229–30. 
 77 See id. at 230. 
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of Portland Terminal, and whether the test used should be applied 
wholesale in an “all or nothing” fashion.78 
1. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 
Some courts have taken a holistic approach to determining 
whether an intern or trainee is an employee under the FLSA and 
have therefore applied a totality of the circumstances test.79 This test 
considers all of the facts surrounding the working relationship and 
the six factors identified by the Wage and Hour Division’s Field Op-
erations Handbook, and it balances them to determine whether the 
intern or trainee qualifies as an employee.80 The Tenth Circuit has 
been a major proponent of this test for some time and the lower 
courts in the Second Circuit have used this test in recent years to 
classify student interns.81 
In Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, the Tenth Circuit 
was tasked with determining whether prospective firefighter train-
ees attending a firefighter academy were employees under the 
FLSA.82 Permanent employment as a firefighter was conditioned 
upon satisfactory completion of a ten-week course, and trainees had 
a reasonable expectation of being hired upon completion.83 Even 
                                                                                                             
 78 See, e.g., Reich v. Parker Fire Protection District, 992 F.2d 1023, 1026 
(10th Cir. 1993) (noting that some jurisdictions follow the Wage and Hour Divi-
sion’s test while others use elements of the test and apply Portland Terminal di-
rectly); Jessica A. Magaldi & Olha Kolisnyk, The Unpaid Internship: A Stepping 
Stone To A Successful Career Or The Stumbling Block Of An Illegal Enterprise? 
Finding the Right Balance Between Worker Autonomy And Worker Protection, 
14 NEV. L.J. 184, 197–200 (2013); Chris J. Perniciaro, Comment, An Emerging 
Liability: Managing FLSA Exposure From Internship Programs In The Private 
Sector, 65 MERCER L. REV. 1131, 1148–57 (2014). 
 79 See, e.g., Reich, 992 F.2d 1023; Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 
U.S. 722, 703 (1947) (“the determination of the relationship does not depend on 
such isolated factors but rather upon the circumstances of the whole activity.”); 
Marshall v. Regis Educ. Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1327–28 (10th Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing the totality of the circumstances approach). 
 80 See Reich, 992 F.2d 1023 (noting that the relevant inquiry is into the total-
ity of the circumstances); Cody Elyse Brookhouser, Note, Whaling on Walling: A 
Uniform Approach To Determining Whether Interns are “Employees” Under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, 100 IOWA L. REV. 751, 758 (2015). 
 81 See Reich, 992 F.2d 1023; Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 
F.R.D. 516, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 82 See Reich, 992 F.2d at 1025. 
 83 Id. 
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certified and experienced firefighters had to complete the academy 
in order to be eligible for hire, and the “curriculum included class-
room lectures, tours of the district, demonstrations, physical train-
ing, and simulations.”84 
The court began by rejecting an all-or-nothing application of the 
six factors, explaining that “the six factors are meant as an assess-
ment of the totality of the circumstances”85 and that “the six criteria 
are relevant but not conclusive to the determination.”86 After as-
sessing the six factors, the court noted that all of the factors except 
one – the expectation of employment upon completion of the course 
– indicated that trainees were not employees, and it concluded that 
the trainees were not employees under the FLSA and not entitled to 
wages.87 Importantly, the court recognized the parallels between the 
academy and a vocational school due to the transferrable skills 
taught.88 Similarly, although the trainees maintained equipment and 
manned a truck near the end of their training, the court rejected the 
argument that the trainees provided productive work because the 
work was supervised and did not displace regular employees.89 
2. ECONOMIC REALITIES TEST 
From 2013 until September 2015, the Eleventh Circuit used the 
economic realities test to determine if a student intern was an em-
ployee under the FLSA.90 The Eleventh Circuit had previously used 
the economic realities test to assess employment status for other 
                                                                                                             
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 1026–27. 
 86 Id. at 1027. 
 87 Id. at 1027–29. 
 88 Id. at 1028. 
 89 Id. at 1028–29. 
 90 See Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing and Coding, Inc., 504 F. App’x 831, 834 
(11th Cir. 2013) (applying the economic realities test). The Eleventh Circuit ef-
fectively replaced this test with its adoption of the Second Circuit’s “tweaked pri-
mary beneficiary” test in September 2015. See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, 
P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1209–10 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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working relationships, such as retirement center patients who per-
formed tasks for the retirement center91 as well as independent con-
tractors.92 In Kaplan v. Code Blue Billing and Coding, Inc. it ex-
panded the test to unpaid interns working for a coding and billing 
company who were required to complete an internship for academic 
credit in order to graduate.93 
In Code Blue Billing, the court explained that an assessment of 
employment status requires consideration of “the economic realities 
of the relationship, including whether a person’s work confers an 
economic benefit on the entity for whom they are working.”94 In 
concluding that the student interns were not employees under the 
FLSA95, the court reasoned that the interns received hands-on work 
experience and academic credit for their formal degree program 
while the company did not benefit because it was required to train 
and supervise the students and review their work, making the busi-
ness run less efficiently.96 The court also noted that the internship 
program satisfied all six factors of the Wage and Hour Division’s 
Field Operation Handbook: The training was similar to that which 
would have been given in school, it benefited the students because 
they received academic credit required for graduation, the interns 
did not displace regular employees, the company received no imme-
diate advantage from the interns and was at times impeded by their 
                                                                                                             
 91 See Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 470 (11th Cir. 
1982). The court here applied the economic realities test to a group of retirement 
home workers including kitchen help, maids, waitresses and other employees. Id. 
at 470–71. Some of these employees had recently been released from a mental 
hospital and performed a variety of tasks; they may have received room and board 
for their work, in addition to hourly wages ranging from $0.17 to $0.55. Id. at 470. 
The court determined that these workers qualified as employees under the FLSA 
and were entitled to wages because their work was of economic benefit to the 
retirement home. Id. at 470–71. 
 92 See Scantland v. Jeffry Knight, Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 
2013) (applying the economic realities test to independent contractors who 
worked as cable and internet technicians and holding that the technicians qualified 
as employees under the FLSA). 
 93 See Code Blue Billing, 504 F. App’x at 834–35. 
 94 Id. at 834. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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presence, and the interns understood that they were neither entitled 
to a job upon completion of the internship nor entitled to wages.97 
3.  PRIMARY BENEFICIARY TEST 
In contrast to the totality of circumstances and economic reali-
ties tests, the primary beneficiary test is used by other courts to de-
termine employment status under the FLSA.98 The thrust of the in-
quiry under the primary beneficiary test is the relative benefits flow-
ing to each party to ultimately ascertain whether the worker or em-
ployer receives the primary benefit of the relationship.99 As would 
be expected, if the worker receives the primary benefit, then the 
worker is not deemed an employee under the FLSA; if the employer 
receives the primary benefit, then the worker is an employee and is 
entitled to wages.100 A critical component of the primary beneficiary 
test is the interpretation of a “benefit,” which courts have extended 
to include both tangible and intangible educational benefits.101 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id. at 834–35. 
 98 The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits have been the strongest supporters of 
the primary beneficiary test. See, e.g., Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, 
Inc., 642 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying the primary beneficiary test to board-
ing school students whose learning consisted of a combination of classroom teach-
ing and vocational training); Atkins v. General Motor Corp., 701 F.2d 1124, 
1127–29 (5th Cir. 1983) (implicitly applying the primary beneficiary to a group 
of machine attendant trainees); McLaughlin v. Ensley, 877 F.2d 1207, 1209 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (noting that the proper test to assess employment status for a group of 
snack food distribution trainees is whether the company or the workers “princi-
pally benefited from the weeklong orientation arrangement.”). 
 99 Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 526; Ashley G. Chrysler, Comment, All Work, 
No Pay: The Crucial Need For The Supreme Court To Review Unpaid Internship 
Classifications Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1561, 1581 (2014) (“[t]he primary benefit test focuses on the benefits flowing to 
each party and ultimately examines whether the employer or the worker receives 
the primary benefit of the working relationship.”). 
 100 See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 526–29; Chrysler, supra note 99, at 1581. 
 101 See Laurelbrook, 642 F.3d at 530–32 (examining the intangible benefits 
afforded to the boarding school students through vocational training and noting 
that intangible benefits “are significant enough to tip the scale of primary benefit 
in the students’ favor even where the school receives tangible benefits from the 
students’ activities.”); Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that boarding school students’ chores were intended to instill a sense of responsi-
bility, teamwork, accomplishment and pride and therefore primarily benefited the 
students). 
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In Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium & School, Inc., for example, 
the Sixth Circuit applied the primary beneficiary test to a group of 
boarding school students who spent half a day taking classes and the 
other half of the day learning practical skills.102 Classroom learning 
and practical training were integrated, and the practical training fa-
cility existed solely as a vehicle for student learning.103 Students par-
ticipated in vocational training in the kitchen and housekeeping de-
partments, and older students were given the option to participate in 
the Certified Nursing Assistant Program.104 The students were not 
paid.105 
The court began by acknowledging and rejecting the economic 
realities test, finding that it “is no more helpful than attempting to 
determine employment status by reference directly to the FLSA’s 
definitions themselves.”106 The court dealt a similar blow to the 
DOL’s six-factor test outlined in the Field Operation Handbook, 
finding it to be “overly rigid” and “inconsistent with Portland Ter-
minal itself, which, as outlined below, suggests that the ultimate in-
quiry in a learning or training situation is whether the employee is 
the primary beneficiary of the work performed.”107 
The court then applied the primary beneficiary test, explaining 
that factors such as whether the relationship displaces paid employ-
ees, whether the relationship has an educational value, and whether 
other factors exist that shed light on which party primarily benefits 
are relevant considerations that can guide the inquiry.108 It ulti-
mately concluded that the students were not employees under the 
FLSA, conceding that the program received certain operational and 
pecuniary benefits, but pointing out that the tangible and intangible 
benefits that accrued to the students made the students the primary 
beneficiaries.109 Notably, the court argued that intangible benefits of 
                                                                                                             
 102 642 F.3d 518, 519–26 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 103 Id. at 520. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Students were not entitled to a job upon graduation. Id. at 521. Unlike tra-
ditional public schools, Laurelbrook was responsible for its students at all times 
and was driven by its religious mission as a boarding school for Seventh-Day 
Adventists. Id. at 520. 
 106 Id. at 522–23. 
 107 Id. at 525. 
 108 Id. at 526–29. 
 109 Id. at 530–32. 
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vocational training, such as learning about responsibility and the 
dignity of manual labor, “are significant enough to tip the scale of 
primary benefit in the students’ favor even where the school receives 
tangible benefits from the students’ activities.”110 
III.   A NEW DIRECTION: THE “TWEAKED PRIMARY BENEFICIARY” 
TEST111 
Until July 2015, no court of appeals had decided whether for-
profit companies with unpaid interns violated the FLSA. In Glatt v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
finally addressed the issue in response to a claim brought by a movie 
production intern working for neither wages nor school credit or 
professional licensure.112 The court formulated a derivation of the 
primary beneficiary test to respond to the key features of the “mod-
ern internship.”113 Although the court touted its sensitivity to the in-
ternship relationship in modern society, it made no distinction be-
tween the various types of “modern internships” that the courts may 
encounter.114 Several months later, in September 2015, the Eleventh 
Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s test wholesale for clinical in-
terns engaged in experiential learning required for degree conferral 
and professional licensure.115 
                                                                                                             
 110 The court viewed these intangible benefits very broadly, and it seemingly 
did not require specific evidence of the intangible benefits received. Rather, par-
ents, alumni and employers testified that their children learned about the im-
portance of working hard, seeing a task to its completion, the need to respect the 
elderly, and the value of leadership skills. Id. at 531.This type of argument may 
be applicable across the gamut of experiential learning programs. 
 111 Note that the test promulgated by the Second Circuit and adopted by the 
Eleventh Circuit was not expressly labeled the “tweaked primary beneficiary” test 
by the courts. It will be referred to by this name to distinguish it from other inter-
pretations of the “primary beneficiary” test, which do not tweak the existing test 
by providing their own set of factors for analysis as the Second Circuit’s test does. 
 112 811 F.3d 528, 531–33 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 113 Id. at 537. 
 114 Id. (the test “is confined to internships and does not apply to training pro-
grams in other contexts.”). 
 115 Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 
2015) (“we now adopt an application of Portland Terminal’s ‘primary benefi-
ciary’ test specifically tailored to account for the unique qualities of the type of 
internship at issue in this case.”). 
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A.   Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 
In Glatt, Plaintiffs Eric Glatt and Alexander Footman were un-
paid interns working on the movie set of Black Swan.116 At the time, 
Glatt was enrolled in a non-degree graduate program, but he did not 
receive academic credit for his internship.117 Footman was not en-
rolled in a degree program at the time of his internship.118 
Glatt interned in the accounting department from December 
2009 through February 2010 and in the post-production department 
from March 2010 to August 2010.119 As an accounting intern, Glatt 
worked roughly 50 hours a week and his responsibilities included 
copying and filing documents, tracking purchase orders, transport-
ing paperwork and maintaining personnel files.120 As a post-produc-
tion intern, Glatt worked roughly 15 hours a week, and his respon-
sibilities included drafting cover letters, organizing paperwork, 
keeping the take-out menus up to date, and running errands.121 
Similarly, Footman interned in the production department from 
September 2009 to February or March of 2010.122 Footman worked 
between 30 and 50 hours a week and his responsibilities included 
setting up office furniture, arranging lodging for cast and crew, tak-
ing out the trash, answering phone calls, photocopying, making cof-
fee, compiling lists of local vendors, and other similar tasks and er-
rands.123 
The court began its analysis by recognizing the benefits of 
properly-designed internship programs, as well as the potential for 
intern abuse, and suggested that circumstances exist in which unpaid 
interns both should and should not be classified as employees.124 
The court then summarily rejected an application of the DOL’s Fact 
Sheet #71, agreeing with the defendants that the proper test is 
“whether the intern or the employer is the primary beneficiary of the 
                                                                                                             
 116 Glatt, 811 F.3d at 532. 
 117 Id. at 532. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at 533–34. 
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relationship.”125 Instead of applying a version of the primary bene-
ficiary test formulated previously by another court, the Second Cir-
cuit put forth its own “tweaked primary beneficiary” test, providing 
a non-exhaustive list of seven factors used to determine whether an 
unpaid intern is an employee: 
1. The extent to which the intern and the em-
ployer clearly understand that there is no expectation 
of compensation. Any promise of compensation, ex-
press or implied, suggests that the intern is an em-
ployee—and vice versa. 
2. The extent to which the internship provides 
training that would be similar to that which would be 
given in an educational environment, including the 
clinical and other hands-on training provided by ed-
ucational institutions. 
3. The extent to which the internship is tied to 
the intern’s formal education program by integrated 
coursework or the receipt of academic credit. 
4. The extent to which the internship accommo-
dates the intern’s academic commitments by corre-
sponding to the academic calendar. 
5. The extent to which the internship’s duration 
is limited to the period in which the internship pro-
vides the intern with beneficial learning. 
6. The extent to which the intern’s work com-
plements, rather than displaces, the work of paid em-
ployees while providing significant educational ben-
efits to the intern. 
7. The extent to which the intern and the em-
ployer understand that the internship is conducted 
                                                                                                             
 125 Id. at 538. 
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without entitlement to a paid job at the conclusion of 
the internship.126 
No one factor is dispositive and courts may consider other fac-
tors beyond the seven factors listed in reaching a conclusion on an 
intern’s employment status.127 According to the court, the “tweaked 
primary beneficiary” test reflects the modern internship’s “relation-
ship between the internship and the intern’s formal educa-
tion . . . [t]he purpose of a bona-fide internship is to integrate class-
room learning with practical skill development in a real-world set-
ting.”128 
B.   Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A. 
In striking contrast to the internship at issue in Glatt, the intern-
ship at issue before the Eleventh Circuit in Schumann involved stu-
dents pursuing a master’s degree and professional certification and 
licensure to become nurse anesthetists.129 The program provided a 
28-month curriculum in which the last 4 semesters consisted primar-
ily of clinical experience.130 Thus, unlike the internship scenario at 
issue in Glatt, the clinical experience was interwoven into the degree 
program and required for degree conferral; the clinical training was 
also required by Florida law and the accreditation agencies govern-
ing the field.131 
The program and the accreditation standards required the stu-
dents to participate in a minimum number of cases and master cer-
tain critical skills including completing preoperative forms, setting 
up and cleaning anesthesia equipment, monitoring patients, stocking 
anesthesia carts, and preparing rooms for use.132 Each clinical 
                                                                                                             
 126 Id. at 537. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. This reasoning seems out of place considering that neither Glatt’s nor 
Footman’s internship was part of their formal education but rather was pursued 
independently. The court’s explanation provides further evidence that it failed to 
consider the specific types of internships at issue before establishing the test. 
 129 Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir. 
2015). 
 130 Id. at 1203. The first 3 semesters consisted primarily of classroom learning. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 1203–04. 
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course had an instructor and required daily evaluations to be com-
pleted by both the student and the supervising employee.133 Students 
wore identifying clothing and were scheduled to work 8-hour shifts 
365 days a year, but often worked for longer periods of time.134 
The court eased into its analysis by rejecting a strict application 
of the Field Operation Handbook’s six-factor test, preferring “to 
take . . . [its] guidance on this issue directly from Portland Termi-
nal.”135 Although it recognized the merits of evaluating the primary 
beneficiary of the internship relationship, the court differentiated be-
tween the type of required clinical training at issue in this case with 
the training at issue in Portland Terminal.136 The court concluded 
that the best way to determine the primary beneficiary is “to focus 
on the benefits to the student while still considering whether the 
manner in which the employer implements the internship program 
takes unfair advantage of or is otherwise abusive toward the stu-
dent.”137 The court then adopted the Second Circuit’s non-exhaus-
tive seven-factor test in whole,138 finding that the factors “effec-
tively tweak the Supreme Court’s considerations in evaluating the 
training program in Portland Terminal to make them applicable to 
modern-day internships like the type at issue here.”139 
Critically, the court explained that a resolution of employment 
status does not need to be an all-or-nothing determination.140 Thus, 
the test may be applied so that portions of a student’s internship are 
deemed a bona fide internship that do not require remuneration, 
while other portions constitute abuse of the internship relationship 
and would require that the student be seen as an employee under the 
FLSA and entitled to wages.141 
                                                                                                             
 133 Id. at 1204. 
 134 Id. at 1204–05. 
 135 Id. at 1209. For a discussion on the varying levels of deference accorded to 
the DOL’s tests, see supra note 75. 
 136 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1209–11. 
 137 Id. at 1211. 
 138 Id. at 1211–12. 
 139 Id. at 1212. This is the basis for referring to the standard as the “tweaked 
primary beneficiary” test. 
 140 Id. at 1214. 
 141 Id. at 1214–15. 
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IV.   PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: WHY THE “TWEAKED PRIMARY 
BENEFICIARY” TEST DOES NOT APPLY TO CLINICAL INTERNSHIPS 
REQUIRED FOR DEGREE CONFERRAL OR PROFESSIONAL 
CERTIFICATION AND LICENSURE 
As a threshold matter, the Second Circuit formulated its 
“tweaked primary beneficiary” test in Glatt in reference to all un-
paid internships at for-profit employers.142 The court failed to dif-
ferentiate between the types of student internships a court may face, 
drawing no distinction between internships for academic credit and 
internships that are pursued independently of an academic pro-
gram.143 More importantly, of those internships pursued as a com-
ponent of an academic program (i.e., an internship receiving aca-
demic credit), the court failed to differentiate between internships 
that are pursued by choice and internships that are required for de-
gree conferral and/or professional certification and licensure, such 
as the internship at issue in Schumann.144 On the contrary, all of 
these internships are lumped together into one group and referred to 
as “the modern internship,”145 to be treated uniformly by the court’s 
revised test. Consequently—and despite its belief otherwise—the 
Eleventh Circuit adopted the “tweaked primary beneficiary” test 
and applied it to a group of interns engaged in clinical training re-
quired for both their degree and professional certification without 
discerning between the types of internships at issue and the applica-
bility of the test to the interns in question.146 
                                                                                                             
 142 Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(“we limit our discussion to internships at for-profit employers.”). 
 143 In fact, the court justified its approach as a reflection on the “central feature 
of the modern internship—the relationship between the internship and the intern’s 
formal education. The purpose of a bona-fide internship is to integrate classroom 
learning with practical skill development in a real-world setting.” See id. at 537. 
However, neither Glatt nor Footman pursued the internship as a component of any 
academic program. 
 144 See id. at 536 n.2. 
 145 See id. at 537. 
 146 The court made several references to the adoption of the entire test as a 
tailored response to the type of internship at issue but failed to explain how an 
adoption of the entire test was appropriate for the clinical internship before the 
court. See, e.g., Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1212 (“[t]he factors that the Second Cir-
cuit has identified effectively tweak the Supreme Court’s considerations in eval-
uating the training program in Portland Terminal to make them applicable to 
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In reference to unpaid internships as a whole, the “tweaked pri-
mary beneficiary” test seemingly favors the employer and will 
likely give employers considerable leeway to use unpaid interns 
without violating the FLSA as long as the work serves an educa-
tional purpose.147 In the narrow context of clinical internships re-
quired for academic credit or professional certification, however, the 
test proves especially problematic for three reasons: (1) although the 
test is “non-exhaustive,” the mere identification of the seven listed 
factors will anchor the courts to those considerations and consist-
ently ensure that clinical interns will not qualify as employees under 
the FLSA; (2) factors two through six will similarly continually in-
dicate that a clinical intern is not an employee under the FLSA; and 
(3) the Eleventh Circuit’s parsing approach to evaluating individual 
activities for an entitlement to wages will be largely unworkable in 
the clinical intern setting and will likely open a floodgate of litiga-
tion. 
                                                                                                             
modern-day internships like the type at issue here.”); id. at 1211 (“[t]his orienta-
tion allows for student internships to accomplish their important goals but still 
accounts for congressional concerns in enacting the FLSA.”). 
 147 See Noam Scheiber, Employers Have Greater Leeway on Unpaid Intern-
ships, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, (July 2, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/07/03/business/unpaid-internships-allowed-if-they-serve-educa-
tional-purpose-court-rules.html?_r=0 (noting that the test hinges largely on the 
internship’s educational benefits and suggesting that Glatt and Footman are likely 
to prevail on remand since neither were enrolled in an educational institution dur-
ing the internship); Susan Adams, Why The Second Circuit Made A Flawed De-
cision In Upholding Unpaid Internships, FORBES, (July 7, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2015/07/07/why-the-second-circuit-
made-a-flawed-decision-in-upholding-unpaid-internships/ (suggesting that the 
“tweaked primary beneficiary” test may open the floodgates to internships that 
provide school credit and create a system in which employers make deals with 
educational institutions for school credit.); Eric Raphan & Rachel Tischler, Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals Adopts “Primary Beneficiary Test” and Provides 
Guidance on the Unpaid Intern Question, SHEPPARD MULLIN LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG (July 27, 2015), http://www.laboremploymentlaw-
blog.com/2015/07/articles/unpaid-volunteers/second-circuit-court-of-appeals-
adopts-primary-beneficiary-test-and-provides-guidance-on-the-unpaid-intern-
question/ (describing the decision in Glatt as “pro-employer” and a “setback for 
plaintiffs.”). 
2016] ONE OF THESE INTERNS IS NOT LIKE THE OTHERS 1327 
 
A. Anchoring theory 
Anchoring theory, or focalism, is a cognitive bias that refers to 
the human tendency to rely on the first piece of information offered 
(the anchor) during the decision-making process.148 Anchoring the-
ory suggests that “individuals anchor, or overly rely, on specific in-
formation or a specific value and then adjust to that value to account 
for other elements of the circumstance.”149 For example, a person 
looking to buy a used car who places significant value on the odom-
eter reading and the year of the car may use those criteria to evaluate 
the value of the car, rather than considering how well the engine is 
maintained.150 
In the context of applying the “tweaked primary beneficiary” 
test to clinical interns, anchoring theory suggests two interrelated 
outcomes: First, that the courts will overly rely on the seven listed 
criteria when evaluating a clinical intern’s employment status de-
spite a commitment to “weighing and balancing [of] all of the cir-
cumstances, including, where appropriate, other considerations not 
expressed in the seven factors.”151 Second, this over reliance on the 
seven listed factors will almost always result in the clinical intern 
failing to be classified as an employee under the FLSA.152 This is 
the case because four (possibly five) of the seven factors examine 
the internship’s relationship to the intern’s educational program and 
curriculum.153 Thus, similar to the used car purchaser who places 
                                                                                                             
 148 See Linda Sapadin, Ph.D., The Anchoring Effect: How it Impacts Your Eve-
ryday Life, PSYCHCENTRAL (July 27, 2013), http://psychcentral.com/blog/ar-
chives/2013/07/27/the-anchoring-effect-how-it-impacts-your-everyday-life/; Dr. 
Jeremy Dean, Anchoring Effect: How the Mind is Biased By First Impressions, 
PSYBLOG (May 23 2013), http://www.spring.org.uk/2013/05/the-anchoring-ef-
fect-how-the-mind-is-biased-by-first-impressions.php. 
 149 Anchoring Bias In Decision-Making, SCIENCE DAILY, http://www.science-
daily.com/terms/anchoring.htm (last visited May 19, 2016). 
 150 See id. 
 151 Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1212 (11th Cir. 
2015) (internal quotations omitted). 
 152 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19. 
 153 Factors two discusses training that is similar to that which would be given 
in an educational environment, factor three examines how integrated the intern-
ship is into the student’s curriculum, factor four addresses whether the internship 
corresponds to the academic calendar and factor five examines whether the in-
ternship endures after beneficial learning concludes. See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 
1212. 
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undue significance on the odometer reading and the year of the car, 
courts using the “tweaked primary beneficiary” test may place an 
over-emphasis on the relationship between the internship and the in-
tern’s educational experience, instead of evaluating which party is 
the primary beneficiary of the relationship. In the context of the clin-
ical internship, in which the clinical training and the academic pro-
gram are fully integrated and indistinguishable,154 this over-empha-
sis will likely be fatal. 
B. Isolated Issues With Factors Two through Six 
Just as factors two through six of the “tweaked primary benefi-
ciary” test may prove problematic as a group for clinical internships 
due to cognitive bias in a court’s evaluation process, these factors 
are similarly troublesome in isolation. 
1. FACTOR 2: SIMILARITIES TO TRAINING IN AN EDUCATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
Factor two examines the parallels between the training offered 
by the internship and the training which would be offered in an ed-
ucational setting, including clinical and hands-on training.155 Be-
cause clinical internships required for graduation and professional 
licensure are the training that would be offered in an educational 
setting, there is a total overlap, and the consideration will continu-
ally favor the employer over the clinical intern. 
Moreover, a reference to what kinds of training activities are ed-
ucational in nature is ambiguous and subjective, especially if the 
court chooses to consider intangible educational benefits, as has 
been done on various occasions in the past.156 Of course, in a differ-
ent internship scenario, such as the movie production internship in 
Glatt, the determination of educational training activities may be 
more clear-cut. This author can envision a court having a difficult 
                                                                                                             
 154 Id. at 1213 (“[i]n a case like this one, where the clinical training and the 
academic commitment are one and the same . . . .”). 
 155 Id. at 1212 (“[t]he extent to which the internship provides training that 
would be similar to that which would be given in an educational environment, 
including the clinical and other hands-on training provided by educational insti-
tutions.”). 
 156 For a further discussion of intangible benefits considered by the courts see 
supra notes 101 and 108–110 and accompanying text. 
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time accepting an argument that brewing coffee and fetching a hypo-
allergenic pillow157 are forms of experiential learning158 that would 
be taught in the classroom. However, returning to the required clin-
ical internship scenario, a court will likely have much more diffi-
culty discerning what activities are educational.159 Tasks that may 
be deemed non-educational in other settings may very well be the 
types of tasks that a clinical intern would be responsible for master-
ing in a classroom setting. For example, borrowing from the list of 
tasks that must be mastered by a student nurse anesthetist in order 
to graduate and obtain a professional license, how would a court in-
terpret the completion of preoperative forms? The setup and clean-
ing of anesthesia equipment? The stocking and re-stocking of anes-
thesia carts?160 
2. FACTOR 3: RELATIONSHIP TO FORMAL EDUCATION 
Similarly, factor three examines “the extent to which the intern-
ship is tied to the intern’s formal education program by integrated 
coursework or the receipt of academic credit.”161 In a clinical intern-
ship setting, the clinical training is a mandated component of the 
degree and professional certification, thus the coursework is always 
integrated and academic credit is always received.162 This consider-
ation will likewise consistently favor the employer. 
                                                                                                             
 157 See Miller, supra note 1; Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 
528, 532. (2d Cir. 2015). 
 158 See Adams, supra note 147 (“[i]t’s tough to argue that emptying the gar-
bage and fetching a pillow is educational.”). 
 159 Note that the Schumann court explicitly identified student nurse anesthe-
tists’ key training activities. See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1203–04. However, un-
like its approach to factors four through six, it did not attempt to provide any 
guidance on how to identify similarities to training for nurse anesthetists in an 
educational setting. See id. at 1213–14. 
 160 See id. at 1203–04. 
 161 See id. at 1212. 
 162 See id. at 1203 (referring to the clinical internship as “a universal clinical-
placement requirement necessary to obtain a generally applicable advanced aca-
demic degree and professional certification and licensure in the field.”); see also 
supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text. 
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3. FACTOR 4: CORRESPONDENCE TO THE ACADEMIC CALENDAR 
Factor four assesses whether the internship corresponds to the 
intern’s academic calendar.163 In a clinical internship scenario, in 
which the clinical training and academic commitment are indistin-
guishable,164 this consideration again favors the employer. In Schu-
mann, however, the court provided supplementary guidance on this 
factor, suggesting that “this consideration must account for whether 
a legitimate reason exists for clinical training to occur on days when 
school is out of session.”165 Taken at face value, the court’s guidance 
could be interpreted to suggest a higher burden placed on the em-
ployer to justify training during periods of no school. Concededly, 
this could be the case in other internship scenarios. Returning to the 
internship scenario in Glatt, a movie studio could face an uphill bat-
tle in explaining why it required its interns to work on a Sunday 
morning only to re-arrange furniture and file paperwork.166 But for 
clinical internships, in which the vast majority required for gradua-
tion and professional certification revolve around the health indus-
try,167 health care employers may have little trouble justifying the 
training in the name of public health and safety.168 As one doctor 
eloquently explained, “hospitals permit around-the-clock observa-
tion of patients . . . [i]f medical staff observe an acute change, they 
can then deliver an acute intervention.” 169 
                                                                                                             
 163 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1212. (“The extent to which the internship ac-
commodates the intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the aca-
demic calendar.”). 
 164 See id. at 1213 (“[i]n a case like this one, where the clinical training and 
the academic commitment are one and the same . . . .”). 
 165 Id. 
 166 These were tasks typical of accounting and production interns. See Glatt v. 
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 532 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 167 No data exists to demonstrate the actual proportion of clinical internships 
that are related to the health industry. However, a simple Google search of “clin-
ical internships” generates a list of health-related clinical internships at hospitals, 
medical research institutions, mental health facilities, etc. See GOOGLE, 
http://google.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2015). 
 168 This furthers the argument that the Eleventh Circuit did not adopt the 
“tweaked primary beneficiary” test in response to the specific internship before 
the court. See supra note 146. 
 169 Dr. Maria Yang, What Is A Hospital? MARIA YANG, M.D. (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://www.mariayang.org/2013/12/10/what-is-a-hospital/. 
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4. FACTOR 5: LENGTH OF INTERNSHIP VERSUS BENEFICIAL 
LEARNING 
Factor five, which assesses the correlation between the intern-
ship’s duration and the period of beneficial learning,170 is equally 
problematic in the context of clinical internships. 
First, it is very unclear how a court would distinguish between 
beneficial learning and non-beneficial learning when the entire in-
ternship is a component of an overall academic program. Implicit in 
the clinical internship is the idea that the student remains a student—
a learner171—until the degree is conferred and/or professional licen-
sure is obtained. Unlike other internship scenarios, in which the 
hands-on activities may or may not be included to teach a skill re-
quired for success in the field,172 clinical training activities have 
been included in the curriculum because the accredited academic in-
stitution and the agencies governing the field have decided that a 
mastery of these skills is a necessary prerequisite to full-time em-
ployment.173 For a court to determine that a clinical internship re-
quired for graduation and licensure exceeds the period of beneficial 
                                                                                                             
 170 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1212 (“[t]he extent to which the internship’s 
duration is limited to the period in which the internship provides the intern with 
beneficial learning.”). 
 171 See Jessica L. Curiale, Note, America’s New Glass Ceiling: Unpaid Intern-
ships, The Fair Labor Standards Act, And The Urgent Need For Change, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 1531, 1553 (2010) (analogizing the modern intern to the “learner”, 
a category of workers subject to exemption from the FLSA because they lack of 
skills which are needed for the occupation). For further discussion on the intern 
as a student and not an employee, see infra Part V. 
 172 For example, it is unclear whether the tasks Glatt and Footman performed 
during their internships contributed or were designed to contribute to beneficial 
learning. A determination falls outside of the scope of this Note but the ambiguity 
is relevant. 
 173 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1203 (noting that the clinical training compo-
nent of the nurse anesthetist program mandated by the school, Florida law, and 
the governing accreditation agencies is in place “to ensure that when a student 
graduates and becomes licensed, she will be able to safely and competently mon-
itor the status of her patients without another licensed professional in the room.”); 
see id. at 1211 (“modern internships can play an important—indeed critical—role 
in preparing students for their chosen careers. Imagine if a CRNA could report to 
work on her first day and be allowed unsupervised to conduct the induction, 
maintenance, and emergence phases of anesthesia administration, having only 
ever read about or watched someone else perform them.”). 
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learning would necessarily require the court to find not only the ac-
ademic program problematic, but also the standards set out by the 
accreditation agencies. 
Second, assuming that a court could somehow determine when 
learning was no longer beneficial, the Eleventh Circuit’s supple-
mentary guidance on this factor makes the playing field for clinical 
interns and employers unequal yet again.174 The Eleventh Circuit 
explains that “designing an internship is not an exact science”175 and 
cautions that courts “should consider whether the duration of the in-
ternship is grossly excessive in comparison to the period of benefi-
cial learning.”176 To solidify its position, the court then offers its 
opinion that “it does not seem . . . that the four-semester duration of 
the [nurse anesthetist] program would have been excessive, no mat-
ter how many cases the student completed”177 unless the reason for 
the excessive cases was because the students were required to work 
“grossly excessive hours.”178 Through this supplementary guidance, 
the court has granted significant leeway to employers to permit in-
ternships that exceed any period of beneficial learning up until a 
level of gross excess.179 Similarly, in assessing an intern’s daily 
schedule for potential abuse by an employer, anything less than 
“grossly excessive hours” will be permitted.180 
5. FACTOR 6: LEVEL OF SUPERVISION 
In the Eleventh Circuit’s words, factor six relates “directly to 
Portland Terminal’s consideration of whether the intern displaces 
regular employees and whether the interns work under the close su-
pervision of existing employees.”181 For clinical internships, an as-
sessment of whether the interns displace regular employees does not 
appear to be problematic. What is of concern, however, is the con-
                                                                                                             
 174 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1213–14. (discussing the application of factor 
five to the intern plaintiffs). 
 175 Id. at 1213. 
 176 Id. at 1213–14 (emphasis added). 
 177 Id. at 1214. (emphasis added). 
 178 Id. (emphasis added). 
 179 See id. at 1213 – 14. 
 180 See id. 
 181 Id. at 1212. 
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sideration of the level of supervision by existing employees. Be-
cause of the nature of the work involved in clinical settings— and 
unlike many other types of internships—supervision is not only rec-
ommended, but it is often required. For example, Florida law man-
dates that nursing programs have provisions in place which ensure 
direct or indirect supervision by program faculty or clinical precep-
tors for nursing students engaged in clinical training.182 Likewise, 
the student nurse anesthetists in Schumann were supervised and 
evaluated daily by a certified nurse anesthetist or an anesthesiologist 
on a variety of specific categories including the anesthesia cart and 
machine, airway set up, patient assessment, and interpersonal be-
havior.183 Evaluating these categories would not be possible without 
some level of close supervision.184 As a result, if a court in the Elev-
enth Circuit were assessing the employment status of a clinical nurs-
ing student, this factor would likely tip in the employer’s favor. 
Thus, in a clinical internship scenario such as the one before the 
court in Schumann, factors two through six will consistently skew 
in favor of the employer due to the unique considerations of the clin-
ical internship.185 What remains is factors one and seven, which con-
sider the extent to which the parties understand that there is no ex-
pectation of compensation or entitlement to a job186 at the conclu-
sion of the internship. Standing alone, these factors do little to ad-
dress which party is the primary beneficiary of the relationship. At 
best, these factors provide only an indication of the parties’ expec-
tations. For a clinical internship required for graduation and licen-
sure in which the internship is a component of the academic curric-
ulum and not a means to recruit a full-time labor force, the parties 
should not expect that the intern will be compensated or entitled to 
a job at the program’s conclusion.187 
                                                                                                             
 182 See FLA. STAT. § 464.019. 
 183 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1204. 
 184 Beginning on January 1, 2010, under the new “CRNA Teaching Rule” set 
forth by the Department of Health and Human Services, the hospital instituted a 
two-to-one SRNA-to-CRNA supervision ratio. See id. at 1206, 1206 n.5. 
 185 See supra Part IV.B. 
 186 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1212. 
 187 See David E. Amaya, A New And More Flexible Approach To Internship 
Programs, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/de-
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On the contrary, many academic programs such as the one in 
Schumann require their student interns to explicitly acknowledge 
that they are not entitled to compensation, are not considered em-
ployees by their participation, and will not be guaranteed a job upon 
graduation.188 In any event, it is unclear how this analysis will help 
identify whether the employer or the student intern is the primary 
beneficiary. Consequently, the net result is a test which may be 
workable in other internship scenarios but which will almost exclu-
sively find that an intern engaged in clinical work required for de-
gree conferral and licensure is not an employee under the FLSA. 
C. The Parsing Approach Is Not Workable 
The Eleventh Circuit added its own twist to the “tweaked pri-
mary beneficiary” framework by suggesting that it does not need to 
be applied in an all-or-nothing fashion.189 According to the Schu-
mann court, the student worker can be deemed an employee for cer-
tain activities (and entitled to wages for those activities), and purely 
an intern for other activities (and entitled to no compensation for 
engaging in those efforts).190 Paradoxically, the court confirms the 
difficulty in applying this parsing approach by referring to only one 
far-fetched example, in which an intern engaged in clinical training 
required for an academic degree and professional licensure in the 
medical field is required to paint an employer’s house.191 The court 
has little difficulty concluding that the student would not be an in-
tern “for work performed within the legitimate confines of the in-
ternship but could qualify as an ‘employee’ for all hours expended 
in painting the house.”192 
                                                                                                             
tail.aspx?g=8e9ffab3-f2fb-4cec-882c-3729721ffb2e (noting that modern intern-
ships in the healthcare industry take the form of clinical trainings required merely 
“for students to advance in their field and become treating providers.” 
 188 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1204. 
 189 See id. at 1214–15. 
 190 See id. 
 191 Id. at 1215. 
 192 Id. The court also implies that the clinical intern would not qualify as an 
employee, effectively providing a concrete answer to the question that the 
“tweaked primary beneficiary” test is supposed to assess. 
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The court constructs this parsing approach to address the possi-
ble exploitation of student interns.193 There is an unquestionable 
need to protect student interns from being taken advantage of by 
employers.194 However, the Eleventh Circuit’s parsing approach is 
flawed because it is largely unworkable in a clinical internship set-
ting. Apart from blatant violations such as the house-painting exam-
ple suggested by the court, it will be extremely challenging for a 
court to assess activities that have a more-direct relationship to the 
clinical training at issue.195 Further, and possibly more importantly, 
the parsing approach may open the doors to an influx of litigation in 
which unpaid interns dice their internships up into subparts and as-
sert claims under the FLSA for specific activities that allegedly do 
“not serve to further the goals of the internship.”196 
                                                                                                             
 193 See id. at 1214–15 (“we can envision a scenario where a portion of the 
student’s efforts constitute a bona fide internship that primarily benefits the stu-
dent, but the employer also takes unfair advantage of the student’s need to com-
plete the internship . . . .”). 
 194 See, e.g., Ross Perlin, Unpaid Interns, Complicit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, 
(April 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/03/opinion/03perlin.html (dis-
cussing the exploitation of student interns); Nick Chowdrey, Internships: Inevita-
ble Career Step or Exploitation?, THE GUARDIAN, (April 29, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/careers/careers-blog/internships-exploitation-ca-
reer-graduates-work-experience (discussing the effects of a race-to-the-bottom 
culture born out of employers’ emphasis on experience rather than a diploma and 
the resulting potential for exploitation of student interns); Paul Solman, How Un-
paid Interns Are Exploited, Fighting Back, and Winning, PBS NEWS HOUR, (Sept. 
27, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/making-sense/how-unpaid-interns-are-
exploit/ (interviewing Eric Glatt and discussing his own experience and the ways 
in which students interns are exploited); Sarah Braun, Comment, The Obama 
“Crackdown:” Another Failed Attempt to Regulate The Exploitation Of Unpaid 
Internships, 41 SW. L. REV. 281, 286 (2012) (discussing the need for new legisla-
tion to respond to exploitative unpaid internships while maintaining beneficial in-
ternship programs). 
 195 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 196 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1215. 
1336 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1 
 
V.   THE CLINICAL INTERN IS A STUDENT—AND A STUDENT IS NOT 
AN EMPLOYEE 
“Sometimes when you’re looking for an answer, you search eve-
rywhere else before you take a look at what’s right in front of 
you.”197 
In adopting the “tweaked primary beneficiary” test specifically 
for clinical interns, the Schumann Court emphasized its desire to 
stay faithful to the text of Portland Terminal.198 The Court then en-
gaged in a comparative analysis, evaluating the DOL’s six-factor 
test, the more traditional “primary beneficiary” test, and the Second 
Circuit’s “tweaked primary beneficiary” test, ultimately settling on 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation.199 As Part IV illustrates, the 
“tweaked primary beneficiary” test is unworkable when applied to 
the clinical intern.200 But what if no test is workable, and Portland 
Terminal provides the very guidance the Court was looking for in 
the narrow context of clinical interns? 
As Portland Terminal explains, 
Had these trainees taken courses in railroading in a 
public or private vocational school, wholly disasso-
ciated from the railroad, it could not reasonably be 
suggested that they were employees of the school 
within the meaning of the Act. Nor could they, in that 
situation, have been considered as employees of the 
railroad merely because the school’s graduates 
would constitute a labor pool from which the railroad 
could later draw its employees.201 
In reference to the clinical internship, this statement is telling 
because it indicates that a clinical student is not an employee of 
                                                                                                             
 197 Dean Hughes, Dean Hughes Quotes, AZ QUOTES, (Jan. 24, 2016, 10:30 
PM), http://www.azquotes.com/author/18248-Dean_Hughes. 
 198 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1209 (“we prefer to take our guidance on this 
issue directly from Portland Terminal and not from the DOL’s interpretation of 
it”); id. at 1212 (agreeing with the Second Circuit’s description of the “tweaked 
primary beneficiary” test as faithful to Portland Terminal). 
 199 See id. at 1208–13. 
 200 See supra Part IV. 
 201 Walling v. Portland Terminal Co, 330 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1947). 
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his/her educational institution. Although seemingly obvious, this ap-
pears to have been overlooked by the Schumann court in its adoption 
of any test to assess the employment status of clinical interns. In 
reality, the clinical intern is not a worker but a student engaged in 
required experiential learning in lieu of traditional classroom educa-
tion. Unlike all other internship scenarios—ranging from the intern-
ship independent of an academic program202 to the loosely-regulated 
but required internship for academic credit203—this hands-on learn-
ing is not supplementary to the clinical intern’s education. Rather, it 
is the clinical intern’s education, a mandatory (and significant) com-
ponent of the intern’s academic program.204 Furthermore, the licens-
ing and accreditation agencies which govern the field have deter-
mined that a mastery of certain skills developed through experiential 
training is required to transition from student to licensed practi-
tioner.205 Thus, the clinical intern is a student until he or she com-
pletes the academic program and any additional licensure require-
ments—and a student is not an employee.206 
Similarly, the clinical setting is not a place of work but an exter-
nal learning environment where the student is taught critical skills 
                                                                                                             
 202 For example, the movie production internship at issue in Glatt v. Fox 
Searchlight Picture, Inc. See supra text accompanying notes 116–23. 
 203 For example, the internship/practicum requirement in place in the majority 
of sports management curriculums. See Kristi L. Schoepfer & Mark Dodds, In-
ternships In Sports Management Curriculum: Should Legal Implications Of Ex-
periential Learning Result In The Elimination Of The Sports Management Intern-
ship?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 183, 184–85 (2010). 
 204 See supra Part IV.B.1, note 164 and accompanying text and text accompa-
nying notes 170–73. 
 205 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 206 The FLSA contains a statutory exemption for employees working in a pro-
fessional capacity. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (exempting those “employed in a 
bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” from FLSA cover-
age). The Department of Labor has clarified that this exemption extends to phy-
sicians as well as medical interns but only if “such a training program is entered 
upon after the earning of the appropriate degree required for the general practice 
of their profession.” See Niki Kuckes, Designing Law School Externships That 
Comply With The FLSA, 21 CLINICAL L. REV 79, 89–90 (2014) (emphasis added) 
(quoting U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division Opinion Letter (July 
27, 1995)). The clear focus on possession of a degree suggests that medical stu-
dents (and by proxy, similarly-situated clinical interns) would not be subject to 
the exemption prior to degree conferral because they are students and not “pro-
fessionals.” 
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required for practice in the field. Unlike skills taught in other aca-
demic programs, these clinical skills cannot be taught sufficiently in 
the traditional classroom setting because their very nature require a 
functioning clinical environment with licensed practitioners who 
perform both teaching and supervisory roles.207 For the clinical set-
ting, the intern is not transformed from a student into an employee 
merely because the supervision and teaching arranged with the aca-
demic institution results in tangential benefits for the clinical setting 
(a point the Schumann Court readily concedes).208 And for the stu-
dent, the clinical setting is not transformed from a classroom into an 
office merely because his/her instructor is not directly employed by 
the student’s academic institution. The student’s academic require-
ments, and not the clinical setting’s business needs, still drive the 
need for the learning to take place.209 
In light of the unique circumstances of the clinical program, in 
which the student must engage in hands-on education in an external 
setting that is closely monitored, but not controlled by, the student’s 
academic institution, viewing the environment as anything but edu-
cational mischaracterizes the relationship between the clinical stu-
dent and the clinical setting.210 The issue thus becomes one of re-
                                                                                                             
 207 See Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1212 (11th Cir. 
2015) (“[i]magine if a CRNA could report to work on her first day and be allowed 
unsupervised to conduct the induction, maintenance, and emergence phases of 
anesthesia administration, having only ever read about or watched someone else 
perform them. The potential danger and discomfort to the patient under such cir-
cumstances is self-evident and startling. So we need anesthesiologists and CRNAs 
who are willing to teach SRNAs their trade through internships.”). 
 208 See id. at 1211 (“[w]e cannot realistically expect anesthesiology practices 
to expose themselves to these [teaching and supervising] costs by providing stu-
dents with the opportunity to participate in 550 cases each, without receiving some 
type of benefit from the arrangement”). Most studies indicate that care is costlier 
at teaching hospitals than at non-teaching hospitals; however, teaching hospitals 
have traditionally offset research and teaching costs through higher prices for pri-
vate payers and supplemental payments from Medicare. John Z. Ayanian & Joel 
S. Weissman, Teaching Hospitals and Quality of Care: A Review of the Litera-
ture, THE MILBANK QUARTERLY, (Sept. 2002), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2690120/. 
 209 See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1213. 
 210 Note that in an employer-employee relationship, the “purported employer 
controls or has the right to control both the result to be accomplished and the 
manner and means by which the purported employee brings about the result.” 
N.L.R.B. v. H & H Pretzel Co., 831 F.2d 650, 653–54 (6th Cir. 1987) (internal 
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framing: if the clinical setting is correctly viewed as an external 
learning environment and the clinical intern is correctly classified a 
student, then the question is no longer whether the student or the 
clinical setting is the primary beneficiary. Indeed, and as Portland 
Terminal alludes to,211 it would be a perverse exercise for the courts 
to assess whether a student is entitled to wages merely because the 
student enrolls in an academic program that provides “training and 
experience . . . under the close supervision of doctors before prac-
ticing on . . . [his or her] own.”212 
Thus, the courts should classify as students the narrow subset of 
interns whose clinical training is a required component of their aca-
demic program and professional certification and licensure. Because 
these interns are students, the courts should not apply any test to 
assess employment status and subsequent entitlement to wages un-
der the FLSA. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 with the goal of protecting 
the nation’s lowest-paid employees who lacked sufficient bargain-
ing power to obtain a subsistence wage.213 Unfortunately, Congress 
                                                                                                             
quotations omitted); see also RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) 
(1958). In clinical settings that teach and supervise clinical students, control is 
shared between the clinical setting and the academic institution over the result to 
be accomplished as well as the manner and means by which to bring about the 
result. For example, the clinical setting in Schumann determined the process used 
to train the nurse anesthetists on a variety of procedures, but the procedures them-
selves were identified as part of the curriculum by the academic institution and 
the governing accreditation agencies. See Schumann, 803 F.3d at 1203–04. Be-
cause the control test only applies to the employer-employee relationship, the clin-
ical intern remains a student if control is shared, but the intern loses an entitlement 
to employee status if the clinical setting does not retain control. As the example 
from Schumann illustrates, the clinical internship involves a variety of scenarios 
in which the clinical setting does not have control over the result or the manner 
and means by which to accomplish the result. It follows, then, that the clinical 
intern cannot be an employee of the clinical setting by process of elimination, but 
he/she remains a student for all experiential training in a clinical setting. 
 211 See supra text accompanying note 201. 
 212 Tripp, supra note 18, at 345. 
 213 See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 (1945). 
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failed to identify what types of workers qualified as employees un-
der the FLSA, and courts and the Department of Labor have strug-
gled to address this issue ever since. 
Portland Terminal provided some clarity and carved out a 
“trainee” exception to the FLSA’s minimum wage requirement.214 
In the wake of Portland Terminal, courts have construed different 
tests to assess whether certain working relationships fall under the 
FLSA.215 
The unpaid internship’s meteoric rise in recent years has caused 
significant debate, but the Supreme Court has yet to address the le-
gality of the unpaid internship. In Glatt, the Second Circuit formu-
lated a non-exhaustive seven factor test to be used to address the 
employment status of modern internships.216 Critically, the court 
failed distinguish between the various types of modern internships a 
court may face and instead provided a one-size-fits-all framework. 
In kind, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the test wholesale and ap-
plied it to a group of student nurse anesthetists engaged in clinical 
training required for graduation and professional licensure.217 The 
Eleventh Circuit should have considered the internship at issue be-
fore adopting the test. As this Note illustrates, the test is not worka-
ble in the clinical internship setting because it essentially ensures 
that the clinical intern will never be considered an employee under 
the FLSA absent unrealistically extreme abusive scenarios.218 The 
test should be abandoned specifically for this subset of student in-
terns. Moreover, no test should be applied to clinical interns because 
clinical interns are students whose required experiential training is 
completed in lieu of traditional classroom learning and in accord-
ance with degree and professional certification requirements.219 As 
students, the clinical interns should not be assessed for employment 
status and entitlement to wages. 
In the future, more courts will begin to address the legality of 
the unpaid internship head on, and will undoubtedly formulate new 
tests and build upon the old. Until the Supreme Court making a final 
                                                                                                             
 214 See supra Part I.B. 
 215 See supra Part II. 
 216 See supra Part III.A. 
 217 See supra Part III.B. 
 218 See supra Part IV. 
 219 See supra Part V. 
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ruling on how to address the unpaid internship, it is critical for courts 
to consider the specific internship at issue before deciding what 
framework to apply. 
